Safety ... First???

 

All those with a more or less directly relation with the aviation industry are clear that their main goal is Safety, or at least that's the illusion that authorities and operators want to give to the general public. But sometimes decisions made by Aviation authorities to ensure that everyone is safe in the air leave much to be desired from this safety point.

 

Case # 01 - Boeing 787

Everyone is by now more or less aware of what happened with the "Dreamliner" by Boeing.

Long story short for those who do not have information. About two months ago international authorities, following the example of the Japanese authority, ordered the immediate detention and suspension of flight permits of the 50 Boeing 787 aircraft into service. This decision was taken after successive incidents during the operation of the aircraft, the most critical being a fire aboard an aircraft from JAL (Japan Airlines) at the Boston airport while the plane was ready to leave on a flight, and less than a week later, the emergency landing and subsequent evacuation due to smoke on board and failure of an aircraft electrical system of an ANA (All Nippon Airlines) aircraft.

Both situations were caused by the same component: the aircraft's lithium batteries. And this is where we ask: how is it possible that in the super rigorous certification process a passenger aircraft, no one had been able to determine the true level of risk of these components, or the possibility that they might be the source of fire, smoke or toxic fumes in flight? The answer is simple: complacency by the authority.

And I say complacency because during the investigation of these incidents have arisen comments and evidence that the certification process has a lot to be blamed, because it haven't been done in the most appropriate way. Supervision of this key components have relied excessively on the manufacturer's control processes and I don't see an adequate level of supervision, since in this case the batteries and charging systems have never been tested together but individually.

This clearly would not be a big problem if all or most components were manufactured dictly by Boeing, but this is not the case and these components came from multiple vendors around the world. It is illogical to think that, despite being the components individually certified, it will not be possible to fail when installed together.

And well, that's what happened. Apparently the system was not prepared or tested enough to be sure it do not generate risks during the operation, and the result of that lack of supervision is being paid today by operators who have to deal with the financial loss of having the aircraft grounded, flights canceled and pending expansion processes.

The good news is that a few days ago the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) initially approved the contingency plan from Boeing to modify the battery system of the aircraft. This will authorize them to install these patches on two aircraft and begin test flights, which will be monitored "very closely" by the FAA to certify the safety of modified and ensure that there is not any possibility fire on board as a result of its operation, and eventually remove the restriction and return the fleet to operation.

 

Case # 02 - knives, bats and other desserts

A few days ago the TSA (Transportation Security Administration), an agency created in the U.S. to prevent attacks using civil aircraft on American soil like those of 9/11, reported that as of April would be reauthorized as part of hand luggage dangerous items such as small knives, baseball bats, sky poles, etc., assuming that these do not represent a greater risk to flight crews of comercial aircraft as these are protected by reinforced doors in the cockpit .

Pardon?, So what about cabin crews that have no protection against unexpected attacks by passengers, or is it that they do not count?

Now flight attendants not only will have to take care of the verbal and physical abuse of drunk or angry passengers, but also from the possibility that one of them in a fit of "air rage" do not stabs or hit them with a bat. Of course, as always, in situations like this airlines can restrict these elements in their cabins, as they may be more restrictive than the norm, but this process would be very cumbersome and expensive.Don't know what logic might be behind this new rule, because I do not understand, but the justification of "improving the transport of passengers and provide more easily checks at points of control" is not enough for me. Moreover, it seems that this "initiative" only serves to "facilitate" the work of the TSA agents, but has no technical justification for its implementation; since it is not taking into account the safety of flight attendants who are the first, and last, line of defense against acts of unlawful interference, sabotage or problematic situations with disruptive passengers in flight.

 

These are the news for this week, hopefully Boeing will solve the 787 problems fast and we will soon have the "Dreamliner" returned to service, but as always keeping an adequate level of safety, primary and supreme end of all our operations.

 

Safe flights!!!